Venezuela: New Clashes Between Revolution and Counter-Revolution are Being Prepared

By Patrick Larsen in Venezuela
Thursday, 30 October 2008

Alí Primera, a famous Venezuelan Communist songwriter, once wrote the following: “An early revolution, we must make. Because the more it is delayed, the more difficult it will be”. These are indeed profound words and they sum up brilliantly the main problems that the Venezuelan revolution is facing today.



Hugo Chávez has been in power for ten years – a period that has seen numerous attempts on the part of imperialism and the oligarchy to overthrow him and put a halt to the social reforms he has been promoting. Time and again the masses of workers, youth and urban poor have moved to defend the revolution.

Growing Inflation, Crime Rates and Sabotage on the Part of the Capitalists

Despite the determination revealed by the masses over and over again, after ten years of almost permanent mobilization and conflict between the classes, the government has still not managed to solve the main problems of society. Although living standards and access to social welfare have improved, the majority of Venezuelans still live in poverty, the infrastructure and transport systems in the cities are still highly insufficient, house prices are souring and so on. At the same time, the crime rate has reached record levels. In Caracas, the number of deaths as a result of crime rose from 70 deaths annually per 100,000 citizens in 1998 to a staggering 130 in 2007.

Although the Minister of Planning, Haiman El Troudi, has been constantly denying that the crisis in the world economy will affect Venezuela, the fact is that the country is completely dependent on imports, especially of food products. Thus, inflation has hit Venezuela particularly hard. Inflation of food products has reached 15.3%. In Caracas prices increased by 49.9% between July 2007 and July 2008.

The government has been trying to tackle the problems by making an appeal to the capitalists for investment in the economy but these have continued to speculate and deliberately hold back food products to cause scarcity and give an extra impetus to inflation.

The wild swings in the price of oil-price are also having an effect on Venezuela. Some sources indicate that PDVSA, the national oil company, will make 40% cutbacks in their next annual budget. This will inevitably hit many of the social projects, the misiones, who are partly or wholly financed by oil revenues.

The idea of a “Socialismo petrolero” (i.e. Socialism financed by oil-incomes) which has been promoted particularly by the Reformist sector of the government is thus clashing head-on with reality. These people have tried to use the high oil-incomes as an excuse for not expropriating the capitalists. What they forgot was, that the situation of Venezuela depends wholly on the world market, not just the oil-price but also the prices of aluminium and other raw materials that Venezuela is producing en masse. While the Venezuelan economy is extremely sensitive to swings in these prices, it is also very much dependent on imports of other goods, as already mentioned. This creates a potentially disastrous economic situation for the country. The only remedy to really tackle this would be the implementation of a planned economy, capable of starting production in fields such as agriculture, food, clothing, etc.

Partial Measures

The Venezuelan government has adopted some measures aimed at tackling economic sabotage and to the benefit of the workers and poor, notably the nationalization of the giant steel factory, SIDOR in April. To this we must add other nationalizations such as that of Banco de Venezuela, the milk producer ”Lacteos Los Andes”, the whole of the cement industry, the aluminium factory Rialca and others.

These nationalizations have been met with enthusiasm by many workers and youth, who correctly see them as a step in the right direction. An opinion poll conducted in May revealed a 56% majority in favour of the nationalization of the cement industries with only 33% against, with 53.1% in favour of the nationalization of SIDOR and only 30.9% against. Even more significant was the response to the question, “Would you agree with nationalization of the food chain?” (which hasn't been expropriated yet). 50.1% said they were in favour and only 30.9% against.

Socialists should support these nationalizations enthusiastically. However, nationalizations in and of themselves do not solve the question. Nationalizations must be part of a socialist plan of production, so that the productive chain can begin to run smoothly and satisfy the needs of the population. But in Venezuela, the nationalizations are still limited to particular parts of the economy while vast capitalist enterprises in key areas are left untouched. Partial measures are thus wholly unable to go to the heart of the problem. What is needed is not just expropriation of this or that particular factory but rather the expropriation of the bourgeoisie as a class and the setting up of a national Socialist plan of production, discussed and run democratically by the organized working class.

New Conspiracies Within the Army

Hugo Chávez is without doubt an outstanding figure in world politics. The reason why he is being constantly attacked by the international bourgeois media is that he has had the courage to stand up against imperialism and to promote the idea of socialism as a viable alternative. In spite of Chávez appealing to the capitalists to invest and in spite of the fact that he has not yet moved decisively to destroy the economic power of the ruling class, the oligarchy and imperialism remain hell-bent on getting rid of him. They understand that his mere presence is dangerous.

In the past couple of months, a number of events have confirmed that there are still important sectors of the army that are not loyal to Chávez and are opposed to the revolution. On September 10, a plot of prominent active and retired army generals was uncovered. An audio recording revealed a detailed plan to isolate Chávez, capture him by force and carry out a coup d'etat. On September 23 a number of hidden weapons, including a large-range cannon, were found in Zulia (a state ruled by an opposition governor), apparently to be sued in the planned coup against Chávez. Again on September 27, it was revealed that the Venezuelan authorities had arrested a general of the Airforce who was involved in a conspiracy.

These conspiracies reveal a profound instability within the armed forces. The forces of the counter-revolution are working as an organized fraction within the army. This is the inevitable result of the vacillation on the part of the government that has sought to keep the army out of the revolutionary movement, by banning the PSUV from operating within the armed forces.

The result is clear: if you keep revolutionary politics out of the army, you will give room to counter-revolutionary politics. The only way to avoid future conspiracies and coups is to organise the revolutionaries in the army while at the same time extending the work of arming the masses that has begun with the National Reserve. All workers, peasants and youth should enter the reserve and fight to convert it into a real people’s militia with links to the revolutionary movement locally, regionally and nationally.

The PSUV and the PSUV Youth

The contradictions in Venezuelan society are as sharp as ever. This is perhaps seen most clearly in the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela). After its founding congress in January-February (See Balance Sheet of the PSUV Congress), the party has been going through a process of selection of candidates for the regional and local elections in November. An impressive 2.5 million members participated in the internal elections in June. In some places the left won significant victories (as in Mérida, Vargas and with many local candidates), but in most places the bureaucracy used the apparatus heavily to impose its candidates and the lack of a real left alternative weighed heavily on the final results.

If the PSUV in its first year has been the arena for constant struggles between the reformist right and the revolutionary left, this was even more the case at the founding congress of its new youth organization (See Venezuela: PSUV Youth Congress) held in September in Puerto Ordáz. At this meeting, 1,300 youth from all over Venezuela gathered. There was a tremendously radical, revolutionary mood and a desire to push forward the revolution. This was reflected in the final assembly, where the most popular slogans chanted by the delegates were: “The Youth is Socialist but never Reformist” and ”Open debate – the rank and file has time.”

While an unelected leadership had pushed the idea of statutes that were completely imposed from above and which subsequently tried to stifle any debate, the pressure of the rank and file forced them to make concessions and alter the statutes, giving room for a more democratic structure with elections of the leadership from below.

The PSUV Youth founding congress represented officially 140,000 youth. All over the country these youth are organizing themselves in youth branches and are fighting to radicalise the revolution. The evolution of the PSUV Youth will without a doubt be decisive for the outcome of the Venezuelan revolution as a whole.

Workers Push for Unity and Action

One of the key events that need to be taken into account to understand the present situation of the Venezuelan revolution is the break-up of the congress of the UNT (Union Nacional de los Trabajadores) in May 2006. The UNT represented and still represents in the eyes of millions of Venezuelan workers a potential instrument for the proletariat to act as the main protagonist in the revolution. However, these hopes were cut across in May 2006 when the UNT held its second national congress. While around 4,000 workers assembled in Caracas, a sectarian row broke out between the leaders of the two tendencies grouped around Orlando Chirino and Marcela Máspero. The congress was physically split up, ending in two separate assemblies, while most delegates returned to their homes frustrated.

The fight between the two tendencies was over questions that did not have anything to do with the real burning issues facing the Venezuelan trade union movement. The split however, served to paralyse the UNT for nearly two years. While there have been important workers’ struggles throughout the country (as at Sanitarios Maracay and SIDOR), the UNT has been unable to play a real role as a revolutionary trade union confederation.

The nationalisation of SIDOR in April was a new turning point. The heroic struggle of the SIDOR workers who achieved the re-nationalization of the company, in spite of the attacks of the multinational and the assistance which it received from the reformist sector in the state apparatus, showed that the Venezuelan working class is striving by all its might to advance the revolution.

It was also a clear lesson for the leaders of the different trade union currents who have been discredited by their passivity and complete lack of perspective for the movement. The victory at SIDOR showed the way forward and was a huge inspiration for workers all over Venezuela. It redoubled the pressure from below. Workers began to demand that the UNT be reactivated. Some bureaucratic sectors around the FSBT (Fuerza Socialista de los Trabajadores, a TU tendency around the former Minister of Labour, José Ramon Rivero), tried to explore the mood by proposing a new trade union confederation. However, they had to halt this process and discuss it more in depth, pressurized by their own rank and file.

Since then the pressure for unity and especially for action has been widespread. In July, representatives of the automobile workers met and drew up a resolution demanding unity and a new joint congress of the workers' movement. On September 4 a regional “Congress of Socialist workers” gathered in Zulia, with the participation of 500 people representing 100 trade unions. This congress was called by rank and file trade unions and its concluding resolution called for “a national congress to re-found the Bolivarian trade-union movement”.

Feeling the pressure from below, some initiatives have been taken from the leaders of the movement. On September 20 a national gathering of trade unionists supporting the PSUV was held in Caracas, organized by the PSUV leadership and supported by most of the wings of the UNT. This meeting, which gathered some 300 trade unionists, saw a radical mood and the main point of the final resolution was a demand for the nationalisation of the banks.

Many things indicate that some sort of national congress of the UNT will be held soon. But the decisive question is not just to have unity, but also how to achieve it and for what purpose. The main tendencies in the Venezuelan trade union movement have revealed their incapacity to show a way forward. In fact, they have deliberately maintained the split, which has led to a criminal impasse in the movement.

Unity cannot be built bureaucratically from above. It cannot be ordered by decree. It must be built from below and it must be built around a programme of action democratically discussed and voted by the rank and file of the trade unions. The regional gathering in Zulia indicated the way forward, when it listed a number of demands, such as the implementation of workers’ control and management in factories, nationalisation of the big private enterprises, state monopoly of the foreign trade and the reduction of the working day to 6 hours.

If the UNT were to begin to fight for these demands and take real measures to implement workers’ control in the factories, it would change the balance of forces completely. The bourgeoisie would be seriously threatened and workers in the whole country would move once again to follow the lead of the UNT.

Regional and Local Elections

A new test for the revolution will be the elections for local mayors and regional governors due on November 23. In the previous elections, the opposition only managed to win the governorship of two states (Zulia and Nueva Esparta). But this time, there is a serious danger of losing other important states, such as Carabobo, Táchira, Miranda and Mérida. To this should be added the possible loss of strategic mayors such as Maracaibo (the second biggest city in the country).

The Bolivarian government still enjoys the support of the majority of the masses. But the defeat in the constitutional referendum last December was a clear warning. After 10 years of revolution, the main problems as outlined above, have not been solved. The masses that support Chávez are growing weary of seeing a lack of profound social changes and a lack of a clear perspective to complete the revolution and finish off the power of the oligarchy once and for all. There has not been a real profound change in the leadership and many official PSUV candidates are widely discredited in the population.

That is why the most likely perspective is an electoral setback for the forces that support the revolution. Of course it is difficult to know exactly how big this will be, but the important thing is to seethe general tendency. The revolution is at the crossroads. The enormous contradictions that have accumulated within society – the contradictions between the ruling class and the working class – cannot remain in deadlock forever. They must be resolved one way or the other.

Even a clear victory in these elections would only prepare the way for an even sharper clash with the oligarchy at some point. Already Chávez has stated that if he wins, he will call a new referendum to see if the constitutional reform can pass this time. This would be a step that the oligarchy could not tolerate and it would begin manoeuvring once more.

The fundamental point for Marxists is to understand that all the objective conditions for completing the Socialist Revolution are present in Venezuela. Why then, has this not been done? The reformists blame the masses for a “low level of consciousness”. But if we analyse the past ten years of revolution, we see that it is these very masses that have saved the revolution from defeat in every important clash with the oligarchy. This was the case in 2002 with the coup d'etat and later with the bosses’ lockout. It was also the case in the re-call referendum of 2004 and the presidential elections of 2006.

The problem is not lack of consciousness of the masses, but the fact that the reformist elements in the leadership do not have a clear socialist perspective. The only solution is to expropriate the key levers of the economy (the banks, the land, the food distribution chain and the remaining industries) and put them under the democratic control of the workers and peasants within a Socialist plan of production. This and this alone can solve the urgent problems facing the Venezuelan revolution today. RENEGADE EYE

Venezuela Six Years after the Coup

Jorge Martin
Friday, 11 April 2008


Six years after the coup against the democratically elected government of Hugo Chávez was defeated by the magnificent mobilization of the masses, the contradictions within the Venezuelan revolution are as sharp as ever.

On March 2nd, delegates to the founding congress of the Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV) returned home after a two month long discussion period. On March 10th the Bush administration in the United States threatened to add Venezuela to its list of "nations that support terrorism". On April 9th, president Chávez announced the nationalisation of the massive SIDOR steel mill, siding with the workers in their 15-month long struggle with Argentinean multinational Techint.. An analysis of these three events provides us with a clear picture of where the Venezuelan revolution is at, the dangers it faces, and which is the way forward.

The building of the PSUV was proposed by Chávez immediately after the victory in the presidential elections of December 2006. The Bolivarian revolution has for a long time faced a contradiction: on the one hand it has derived its strength from the massive mobilization and support of the masses of workers and peasants organized in thousands of different organizations (land reform committees, revolutionary trade unions, Bolivarian circles, neighbourhood groups, etc.), but on the other hand it lacked a nationwide democratic revolutionary organization through which they could express themselves politically. The Bolivarian parties that stood in past elections were rightly regarded by the masses as no more than electoral machines controlled by unelected and unaccountable cliques of bureaucrats, careerists, corrupt local and regional politicians, etc.

Every time the masses of workers and peasants were given a channel to organize and take the reigns of the revolution they took it with both hands. A million and a half joined the Bolivarian circles at the end of 2001. More than 2 million were organized in the Electoral Battle Units during the recall referendum in August 2004. But also, every time they tried to coordinate their efforts at the neighbourhood, local and regional levels, the bureaucracy and the reformists blocked them. Thus, when president Chávez made a call to form the PSUV, and for this to be "the most democratic party in the history of Venezuela", the masses correctly understood this as an appeal to get rid of the bureaucracy which is acting as a brake on their revolutionary initiative.

In just two months in early 2007, 5.6 million Venezuelans – women, youth, workers, peasants, and unemployed – registered to join the PSUV. 1.8 million of them attended regular weekly meetings of their local Socialist Battalions. This was extraordinary. Once again, the Bolivarian masses had responded. But, as we warned at the time, the fate of the PSUV could not be determined in advance. It would be the result of a fierce struggle between the revolutionary left of the movement and its reformist and bureaucratic sectors.

During six weekend sessions, more than 1,600 delegates met to discuss the declaration of principles and statutes of the new party. The clash between left and right was evident from the very beginning. On the first day of the congress a majority of delegates asserted their will to have control over the proceedings by protesting that they had not been consulted on the agenda or the order of the discussions. This was the mood that prevailed throughout the congress and which was reflected in some of the decisions and votes that took place. For instance, the PSUV declared itself as an anti-capitalist party, based among other principles on those of scientific socialism, and having among its guiding figures those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. The fact that the congress delegates met over six different sessions allowed the left wing, which at the beginning was atomised, to become more coordinated. Most of the delegates were representatives of this layer of "natural leaders" at the local and neighbourhood level, and here they had a chance, for the first time, to get to know each other, to exchange experiences and discuss ideas.

On March 9th some 80,000 members of the PSUV participated in the first internal elections to select a provisional national leadership composed of 15 full members and 15 alternates. Despite the fact that known figures, many of them from the old Bolivarian parties, made up the bulk of those elected, there were a number of significant surprises. Diosdado Cabello, who had emerged during the congress as the main representatives of what in Venezuela is called the "home grown right wing" of the movement, did not make it onto the list of 15 full members, despite being well known and having played a prominent role throughout the congress. It was a clear vote against the right wing and against bureaucratic methods within it.

A whole number of other prominent governors, local mayors, etc., did not make it into the list of 30 who were elected. Many of those elected were those considered to be more left wing, less connected with political party apparatuses, more removed from the bureaucracy, etc. Others clearly identified with the revolutionary left of the Bolivarian movement, missed election only narrowly. The cut off point was set at 12,000 votes and several prominent left-wing candidates all got more than 10,000. Freddy Navas, a supporter of the Revolutionary Marxist Current (CMR) received 9,000 votes standing on a clear Marxist platform. Navas explains how the political discussions and the votes both "reflect a high level of consciousness amongst the members of the party, an iron will to take the revolution forward and a clear search for a revolutionary left wing alternative".

After the defeat of the constitutional reform referendum in December 2007, the oligarchy realized that their tactics had worked. They had applied massive pressure on the economy, with a campaign of sabotage of the food distribution chain and had managed to push a significant number of chavista supporters to abstain. They are not strong enough to make open war or military intervention a part of their agenda at the moment, so they hope to gradually wear down support for the revolution through a relentless campaign in the media, international pressure, economic sabotage, etc., and to win some institutional spaces in the November regional elections.

Colombia's recent incursion into Ecuador to kill the FARC guerrillas' second-in-command had a clear aim: to stop the process of humanitarian negotiations which was increasing the prestige of Chávez in Colombia and putting president Uribe in an increasingly embarrassing position. The attack, a violation of Ecuador's national sovereignty, and carried out with support from US forces based at Manta in Ecuador, also aimed to paint Venezuela as a "terrorist-aiding" country. During the raid, Colombian forces allegedly recovered a laptop containing information linking the FARC with an attempt to make a "dirty bomb", and linking Venezuela and Ecuador with the "terrorist" FARC and narco-trafficking. This is all part of the propaganda war against the Bolivarian revolution, in the same way that "weapons of mass destruction" were part of the build up to the invasion of Iraq.

But the most damaging part of the campaign of imperialism and the oligarchy is that of economic sabotage. In early 2008, the Venezuelan government discovered thousands of tons of food hidden in warehouses and trucks, being diverted to Colombia or the black market. This confirmed what everybody already knew. Food shortages in Venezuela were part of a concerted campaign organized by the oligarchy. But raids and seizures alone will not solve the problem. Only a serious offensive, based on the revolutionary initiative of the PSUV members and revolutionary trade unions, to occupy, expropriate and run under workers' control and management the means of production can put an end to the capitalists' strike which is crippling the Venezuelan economy and undermining support for the revolution.

On March 15 Chávez announced the nationalization of a dairy processing plant and a large chain of slaughterhouses which would give the state control over 40 percent of the milk processing and 70 percent of the meat processing sectors. Then, on April 3rd, he announced the nationalisation of the whole of the cement industry, controlled by three multinationals, the Mexican Cemex, the French Lafarge and the Swiss Hoclim. These are steps in the right direction, but must be extended to the whole of the food distribution chain and to all the key sectors of the economy.

The SIDOR steel mill strike clearly illustrates the dangers facing the revolution. Here we have one of the most important industries in the country, in an area with the largest concentration of the industrial proletariat. There are nearly 15,000 workers at SIDOR, a third of them working in-house and two-thirds working for a myriad of outside contractors. The company was privatised in 1997 under the Caldera government, when the former guerrilla leader Teodoro Petkoff was in charge of privatisations. SIDOR is now owned by Argentinean-Italian multinational Techint which has made millions in profits on the back of tremendous exploitation of the workers, which has resulted in a marked increased in deaths and accidents at work.

When Chávez made a call to "nationalise all that was privatised" in January 2007, the workers responded with spontaneous walk-outs and by raising the Venezuelan flag over SIDOR's installations. Finally, after many negotiations and pressure from the Argentinean government of Kirchner, an agreement was reached between Techint and the Venezuelan government. The company was to sell to the national market at preferential prices and in exchange, there would be no nationalisation. But throughout the 13 months of the collective bargaining negotiations the company has had a provocative attitude. Finally, the workers' patience ran out and they started a series of stoppages in January, February and March.

What was the response of the Ministry of Labour? First of all they tried to impose binding arbitration. Then on March 14th the National Guard was sent to brutally repress the workers during an 80-hour strike. The workers and the masses in the region have responded with a clear class instinct, organizing solidarity meetings and pickets, threatening strikes in other plants, etc.

Adel El Zabayar, a Bolvarian member of the National Assembly who came out publicly for the nationalisation of SIDOR explained: "There are sectors within the state that play at wearing down the government, using government authorities to assume a bosses' attitude". This is precisely the problem: the state apparatus remains largely the same, and a capitalist state cannot be used to carry out a socialist revolution.

Furthermore, the attitude of the Minister of Labour, José Ramón Rivero, accusing the workers of being counter revolutionary, siding with the company and putting pressure on the workers to accept the company’s offer, was playing into the hands of the right wing which was attempting to exploit the conflict. Finally, on April 9th, Chávez intervened on the side of the workers and announced the nationalisation of SIDOR. This is an important victory for the workers of SIDOR and will certainly have an impact on the struggle of Venezuelan workers as a whole.

In these three examples we see the dangers that threaten the Venezuelan revolution: a capitalist state apparatus which has not been destroyed and that is acting to sabotage the revolution, an economy which is still under the control of the oligarchy, which uses it to sabotage the revolution, and a reformist, bureaucratic right wing of the Bolivarian movement which is doing its best to block the revolutionary initiative of the masses and prevent the revolution from being completed and thus undermining its social base of support.

If these problems remain unsolved, the Bolivarian revolution will be defeated. But in the rank and file of the PSUV and among the SIDOR workers, there are the forces that can take the revolution to victory. They need to be organized around a genuine revolutionary socialist and internationalist programme which alone can guarantee success.
RENEGADE EYE