This is another excellent assessment by intelligence think tank Stratfor. This page shows how dynamic the situation in the Middle East has become. As they say "You can't tell the players, without a program."
By Reva Bhalla
October 14, 2010
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in Beirut on Oct. 13 for his first official visit to Lebanon since becoming president in 2005. He is reportedly returning to the country after a stint there in the 1980s as a young Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer tasked with training Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. A great deal of controversy is surrounding his return. Rumors are spreading of Sunni militants attempting to mar the visit by provoking Iran’s allies in Hezbollah into a fight (already the car of a pro-Hezbollah imam who has been defending Ahmadinejad has been blown up), while elaborate security preparations are being made for Ahmadinejad to visit Lebanon’s heavily militarized border with Israel.
Rather than getting caught up in the drama surrounding the Iranian president’s visit, we want to take the opportunity provided by all the media coverage to probe into a deeper topic, one that has been occupying the minds of Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah officials for some time. This topic is the durability of the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria alliance, which STRATFOR believes has been under great stress in recent months. More precisely, the question is: What are Syria’s current intentions toward Hezbollah?
The Origins of the Alliance
To address this topic, we need to review the origins of the trilateral pact, starting with the formation of an alliance in 1979 between secular Alawite-Baathist Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ideologically speaking, the Syrian Alawite elite represent an offshoot of Shiite Islam that the Sunnis consider apostate. They found some commonality with the Shiite clerical elite in Tehran, but there were also broader strategic motivations in play. At the time, Syria was on a quest to establish the country’s regional prowess, and it knew that the first steps toward this end had to be taken in Lebanon. From the Syrian point of view, Lebanon is not just a natural extension of Syria; it is the heartland of the Greater Syria province that existed during Ottoman times. Since the days of Phoenicia, what is modern-day Lebanon has been a vibrant trading hub, connecting routes from the east and south to the Mediterranean basin. For Syria to feel like it has any real worth in the region, it must dominate Lebanon.
A civil war that had broken out in Lebanon in 1975 (and lasted through 1990) afforded Syria such an opportunity. The main obstruction to Syria’s agenda at the time, besides Israel, was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat, whose vision for a unified Palestine and whose operations in Lebanon ran counter to Syria’s bid for regional hegemony. The PLO, in fact, was one of the main reasons Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1975 on behalf of its Maronite Christian allies. At the same time, Syria was looking for an ally to undermine the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, with whom the Syrian Baathists had a deep-seated rivalry. An alliance with Iran would grant Syria some much-needed individuality in a region dominated by the Arab powers Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Coming off the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and going into what would become a long and bloody war with Iraq, Iran was also looking for a venue to counter the Baathist regime in Baghdad. In addition, Iran was looking to undermine the Pan-Arab vision, establish a presence in the Levant and promote its own Islamic vision of government. In opposition to Israel, Hussein and Arafat, Iran and Syria thus uncovered the roots of an alliance, albeit one that was shifting uneasily between Syrian secularity and Iranian religiosity.
The adoption of Hezbollah by the two unlikely allies in 1982 was what helped bridge that gap. Hezbollah, an offshoot of Amal, the main Shiite political movement at the time, served multiple purposes for Damascus and Tehran. Syria found in Hezbollah a useful militant proxy to contain obstructions to Syrian influence in Lebanon and to compensate for its own military weakness in comparison to Israel. In the broader Syrian strategic vision, Hezbollah would develop into a bargaining chip for a future settlement with Israel once Syria could ensure that Lebanon was firmly within Syria’s grasp and was therefore unable to entertain a peace deal with Israel on its own.
The Iranians saw in Hezbollah the potential to export its Islamic Revolution into the Arab world, a strong binder for its still new and shaky alliance with Syria and a useful deterrent in dealing with adversaries like Israel, the United States and Saudi Arabia. So, Iran and Syria set out to divide their responsibilities in managing this militant proxy. Iran was primarily in charge of bankrolling, training and enforcing the group’s ideological loyalty to Tehran with IRGC assistance. Syria was in charge of creating the conditions for Iran to nurture Hezbollah, mainly by permitting IRGC officers to set up training camps in the Bekaa Valley and by securing a line of supply for weapons to reach the group via Syria.
But the triumvirate did not get off to a very smooth start. In fact, Hezbollah and Syria clashed a number of times in the early 1980s, when Syria felt the group, under Iranian direction, went too far in provoking external intervention (and thus risked drawing Syria into conflict). If Hezbollah was to operate on Syrian territory (as Syria viewed it) in Lebanon, Syria wanted Hezbollah operating on its terms. It was not until 1987, when Syrian troops in Lebanon shot 23 Hezbollah members, that Hezbollah fully realized the importance of maintaining an entente with Syria. In the meantime, Hezbollah, caught between occasionally conflicting Syrian and Iranian agendas, saw that the path to the group’s survival lay in becoming a more autonomous political — as opposed to purely militant — actor in the Lebanese political arena.
A Syrian Setback
The Iran-Hezbollah-Syria alliance operated relatively smoothly through the 1990s as Hezbollah gradually built up its political arm and as Syria kept close watch on the group through its roughly 14,000 troops and thousands of intelligence agents who had remained in Lebanon since the end of the civil war. In 2000, with Iranian and Syrian help, Hezbollah succeeded in forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon’s southern Security Zone, an event that greatly boosted Hezbollah’s credentials as a Lebanese nationalist actor.
But fresh challenges to the pact came with the turn of the century. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, in particular, was a defining moment for both Iran and Syria. The two allies felt enormously uncomfortable with having the world’s most powerful military on their borders, but they were also presented with an immediate opportunity to unseat their mutual archrival, Saddam Hussein. Iran and Syria also had different endgames in mind for a post-Hussein Iraq. Iran used its political, militant and intelligence links to consolidate influence in Iraq through the country’s Shiite majority. In contrast, Syria provided refuge to Iraq’s Sunni Baathists with the aim of extending its sphere of influence in the region through a secularist former-Baathist presence in Baghdad. The Syrians also planned to use those Sunni links later to bargain with the United States for a seat at the negotiating table, thereby affirming Syrian influence in the region.
But before Syria could gain much traction in its plans for Iraq, its agenda in Lebanon suffered a serious setback. On Feb. 14, 2005, a massive car bomb in Beirut killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a powerful and vocal opponent of Syrian authority in Lebanon. The bombing is strongly believed to have been orchestrated by elements within the Syrian regime and executed by members of Hezbollah. While a major opponent of the Syrian regime was thereby eliminated, Syria did not anticipate that the death of al-Hariri would spark a revolution in Lebanon (which attracted the support of countries like France and the United States) and end up driving Syrian troops out of Lebanon. The vacuum that Syria left in Lebanon was rapidly filled by Iran (via Hezbollah), which had a pressing need to fortify Hezbollah as a proxy force as war tensions steadily built up in the region over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Though Syria knew it would only be a matter of time before it would return to Lebanon, it also had a strategic interest in demonstrating to the Israelis and the Americans the costs of Syria’s absence from Lebanon. The regime wanted to show that without a firm Syrian check on Hezbollah, disastrous events like the 2006 summer confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel could occur.
The Syrian Comeback
It has now been more than five and a half years since the al-Hariri assassination, and there is little question that Syria, once again, has reclaimed its hegemonic position in Lebanon. The Syrian intelligence apparatus pervades the country, and Lebanese politicians who dared to speak out against the Syrian regime are now asking for forgiveness. In perhaps the most glaring demonstration of the political tide shifting back toward Damascus, Saad al-Hariri, the son of the slain al-Hariri and Lebanon’s reluctant prime minister, announced in early June that Lebanon had “made a mistake” in making a “political accusation” against Syria for his father’s murder. The message was clear: Syria was back.
That message did not necessarily sit well with Hezbollah and Iran. Syria wants to keep Hezbollah in check, returning to the 1990s model when Syrian military and intelligence could still tightly control the group’s movements and supplies. Iran and Hezbollah have also watched as Syria has used its comeback in Lebanon to diversify its foreign policy portfolio over the past year. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for example, have been cozying up to Damascus and have quietly bargained with the al Assad regime to place checks on Hezbollah as a way to undermine Iran’s key proxy in the Levant. As long as these regional powers recognize Syria’s authority in Lebanon, Syria is willing to use those relationships to exonerate itself from the al-Hariri assassination tribunal, rake much-needed investment into the Syrian economy and, most important, re-establish itself as a regional power. Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s decision to visit Beirut alongside Saudi King Abdullah was a deliberate signal to Hezbollah and Iran that Syria had options and was not afraid to display them.
This does not mean Syria is ready and willing to sell out its Hezbollah and Iranian allies. On the contrary, Syria derives leverage from maintaining these relationships and acting as the bridge between the Shiite revivalists and the Sunni powers. Syria has illustrated as much in its current mediation efforts among the various Iraqi factions that are torn between Iran on one side and the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the other. But if we go back to reviewing the core reasons Syria agreed to an alliance with Iran and Hezbollah in the first place, it is easy to see why Hezbollah and Iran still have a lot of reason to be worried.
Syria’s priority in the early 1980s was to achieve suzerainty in Lebanon (done), eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq (done) and remove any key obstacles in Lebanon that could challenge Syria’s authority. In the 1970s, that obstacle was the PLO. Today, that obstacle is Hezbollah and its Iranian backers, who are competing for influence in Lebanon and no longer have a good read on Syrian intentions. Hezbollah relies heavily on Syria for its logistical support and knows that its communication systems, for example, are vulnerable to Syrian intelligence. Hezbollah has also grown nervous at the signs of Syria steadily ramping up support for competing militant groups — including the Amal Movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, al-Ahbash, the Nasserites, the Baath Party and the Mirada of Suleiman Franjiyye — to counter Hezbollah’s prowess.
Meanwhile, Iran is seeing one of the key prongs in its deterrent strategy — Hezbollah — grow increasingly vulnerable at a time when Iran is pressed to demonstrate to the United States and Israel that the costs of an attack on its nuclear installation are not worth incurring. The Iranian competition with Syria does not end in Lebanon, either. In Iraq, Syria is far more interested in establishing a secularist government with a former Baathist presence than it is in seeing Baghdad develop into a Shiite satellite for the Iranians.
For now, Syria is adroitly playing both sides of the geopolitical divide in the region, taking care to blend its reassurances toward the alliance and its primary negotiating partners in Saudi Arabia with threats of the destabilization that could erupt should Syria’s demands go ignored. Syria, for example, has made clear that in return for recognition of its authority in Lebanon it will prevent Hezbollah from laying siege on Beirut, whether they are ordered to do so by Tehran as part of an Iranian negotiating ploy with the Americans or whether they act on their own in retaliation against the al-Hariri tribunal proceedings. At the same time, Syrian officials will shuttle regularly between Lebanon and Iran to reaffirm their standing in the triumvirate. Behind this thick veneer of unity, however, a great deal of apprehension and distrust is building among the allies.
The core fear residing in Hezbollah and Iran has to do with Syrian intentions moving forward. In particular, Hezbollah would like to know if, in Syria’s eyes, the group is rapidly devolving from strategic patron to bargaining chip with every ounce of confidence that Syria gains in Lebanon. The answer to that question, however, lies not in Syria but in Israel and the United States. Israeli, U.S. and Saudi policymakers have grown weary of Syria’s mercantilist negotiating style in which Syrian officials will extract as much as possible from their negotiating partners while delivering very little in return.
At the same time, Syria cannot afford to take any big steps toward militant proxies like Hezbollah unless it receives firm assurances from Israel in backchannel peace talks that continue to stagnate. But Syria is also sensing an opportunity at its door: The United States is desperate to complete its exit strategy from Iraq and, like Israel, is looking for useful levers to undermine Iranian clout in the region. One such lever is Syria, which is why the mere idea of Israel and Syria talking peace right now should give Iran and Hezbollah ample food for thought.
RENEGADE EYE
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hezbollah. Show all posts
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Monday, October 11, 2010
Hamas, Hezbollah, and So-Called “Resistance” Against Zionist Imperialism
I recently discovered a blog called The Charnel-House. It is a socialist blog devoted to philosophy and art. I found it to be one of the most insightful blogs on the left, and should be supported. The writer doesn't pull punches. This piece is a good piece for discussion.
To all those who support the actions of jihadist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas on the grounds that they are supposedly putting up brave “resistance” to the imperialist forces of the U.S.-backed Israeli military, I submit the following quotes from Lenin (whose original theory of imperialism is unfortunately claimed as an inspiration by so many the anti-imperialist zombies floating around today). First, from chapter five of his 1916 work, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism:
“Imperialism is as much our ‘mortal’ enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism, and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, it is not every struggle against imperialism that we should support. We will not support a struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will not support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism.
Consequently, once the author admits the need to support an uprising of an oppressed nation (‘actively resisting’ suppression means supporting the uprising), [Kievskii] also admits that a national uprising is progressive, that the establishment of a separate and new state, of new frontiers, etc., resulting from a successful uprising, is progressive.”
Notice, Lenin states that Marxists should only support progressive political tendencies in their struggle to achieve national self-determination. I.e., not the reactionary jihadist forces of Hezbollah and Hamas, whose sexist and homophobic ideology is founded on the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, if Lenin didn’t make himself clear enough on this score here, he spelled it out even more explicitly in 1920:
“With regard to the more backward states and nations, in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate, it is particularly important to bear in mind:
first, that all Communist parties must assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in these countries, and that the duty of rendering the most active assistance rests primarily with the workers of the country the backward nation is colonially or financially dependent on;
second, the need for a struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries;
third, the need to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs, etc.”
Now I understand that many critics of Israel are influenced by Homi Bhabha’s post-colonial theory, and are familiar with his tedious notion of “hybridity.” Still, in light of Lenin’s unequivocal call here for Communist parties of all nations to combat Pan-Islamism and similar forces, it strikes one as exceptionally odd that some today would attempt to create a hybrid “International Pan-Islamic Communist Party of Proletarian Islam,” which claims to “believe in the Teachings of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” while “also believ[ing] in and follow[ing] the Revolutionary Communist teachings of V.I. Lenin [!!], Mirza Sultan-Galiev, Tan Malaka [this makes sense, obviously], J.V. Stalin, Mao Zedong, Kwame Nkrumah, Fidel.” This ideological confusion is compounded by the fact that Stalin personally signed the order to have Mirza Sultan-Galiev executed in 1940, on grounds of deviation brought about by his attempt to synthesize Marxism with pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas (despite his perverse authoritarianism and numerous betrayals of revolutionary Marxism, it seems Stalin remained in fundamental agreement with Lenin on this point, at least).
Disregarding such extreme and contradictory manifestations of this bizarre tendency of leftists today to side with reactionary movements in their struggle against imperialism, we may return to the more troubling mainstream phenomenon of which this is a symptom. Imperialism, as Lenin states, is more progressive than the fanatical religious tendencies that fight to resist it, or the so-called “Marxist” groups (the PFLP, the LCP) that collude with them. But to be clear, this does not amount to an endorsement of U.S. or Israeli policies of aggression. All that it means is one should not support tendencies that are even more wretched than foreign, imperialist domination, simply in the name of national self-determination.
RENEGADE EYE
To all those who support the actions of jihadist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas on the grounds that they are supposedly putting up brave “resistance” to the imperialist forces of the U.S.-backed Israeli military, I submit the following quotes from Lenin (whose original theory of imperialism is unfortunately claimed as an inspiration by so many the anti-imperialist zombies floating around today). First, from chapter five of his 1916 work, A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism:
“Imperialism is as much our ‘mortal’ enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism, and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, it is not every struggle against imperialism that we should support. We will not support a struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will not support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism.
Consequently, once the author admits the need to support an uprising of an oppressed nation (‘actively resisting’ suppression means supporting the uprising), [Kievskii] also admits that a national uprising is progressive, that the establishment of a separate and new state, of new frontiers, etc., resulting from a successful uprising, is progressive.”
Notice, Lenin states that Marxists should only support progressive political tendencies in their struggle to achieve national self-determination. I.e., not the reactionary jihadist forces of Hezbollah and Hamas, whose sexist and homophobic ideology is founded on the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, if Lenin didn’t make himself clear enough on this score here, he spelled it out even more explicitly in 1920:
“With regard to the more backward states and nations, in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-peasant relations predominate, it is particularly important to bear in mind:
first, that all Communist parties must assist the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement in these countries, and that the duty of rendering the most active assistance rests primarily with the workers of the country the backward nation is colonially or financially dependent on;
second, the need for a struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries;
third, the need to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends, which strive to combine the liberation movement against European and American imperialism with an attempt to strengthen the positions of the khans, landowners, mullahs, etc.”
Now I understand that many critics of Israel are influenced by Homi Bhabha’s post-colonial theory, and are familiar with his tedious notion of “hybridity.” Still, in light of Lenin’s unequivocal call here for Communist parties of all nations to combat Pan-Islamism and similar forces, it strikes one as exceptionally odd that some today would attempt to create a hybrid “International Pan-Islamic Communist Party of Proletarian Islam,” which claims to “believe in the Teachings of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” while “also believ[ing] in and follow[ing] the Revolutionary Communist teachings of V.I. Lenin [!!], Mirza Sultan-Galiev, Tan Malaka [this makes sense, obviously], J.V. Stalin, Mao Zedong, Kwame Nkrumah, Fidel.” This ideological confusion is compounded by the fact that Stalin personally signed the order to have Mirza Sultan-Galiev executed in 1940, on grounds of deviation brought about by his attempt to synthesize Marxism with pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas (despite his perverse authoritarianism and numerous betrayals of revolutionary Marxism, it seems Stalin remained in fundamental agreement with Lenin on this point, at least).
Disregarding such extreme and contradictory manifestations of this bizarre tendency of leftists today to side with reactionary movements in their struggle against imperialism, we may return to the more troubling mainstream phenomenon of which this is a symptom. Imperialism, as Lenin states, is more progressive than the fanatical religious tendencies that fight to resist it, or the so-called “Marxist” groups (the PFLP, the LCP) that collude with them. But to be clear, this does not amount to an endorsement of U.S. or Israeli policies of aggression. All that it means is one should not support tendencies that are even more wretched than foreign, imperialist domination, simply in the name of national self-determination.
RENEGADE EYE
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Uprising in Lebanon: For Revolution or Stabilization?
By Dekel Avshalom in Israel
Tuesday, 13 May 2008
Well over 60 people have been killed during the street fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Maronite militias. What instigated the fighting was a decision of the Lebanese government to eliminate Hezbollah's telecommunications network. Hezbollah leaders regarded that move as a declaration of war on their movement and started an armed struggle against the government.
During the fighting, the utter impotence of the Lebanese state was clearly evident. It took only two days for Hezbollah to conquer the west of the capital city Beirut. Prime Minister Fuad Siniora ordered the army to intervene, but the army refused his command. The only ones that were prepared to fight for "stability" were the Maronite militias. After realizing the weakness of the state, Siniora backed down completely, announcing that Hezbollah's telecommunications network would remain intact.
The recent events show beyond any shadow of a doubt that the Lebanese state has no real power, and has stopped functioning. It is also clear that today Hezbollah is the most powerful political movement in Lebanon. Since the end of the 2006 war against Israel, there has been nothing to stop Hezbollah from taking control of the state and removing the minority-rule of the Maronite oligarchy. However, Hezbollah still seems to respect the Lebanese "rules of the game". It even expressed support for the Lebanese chief of staff - the Maronite Michel Suleiman - as the country's next president. What prevented Hezbollah from taking over lies in the nature of the Lebanese class struggle.
Class Struggle in Lebanon
Like many "post"-colonial counties, Lebanon is an artificial state, created by French imperialism. It was fashioned in a way that would allow the leaders of a Francophile religious sect - the Maronite Christians - to control the state while being a very small minority in the Muslim dominated Middle East.
A controversial ethnic survey conducted in 1932 showed that the Maronites were the largest ethnic group in Lebanon (although not having an absolute majority). The other two major groups were the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. This survey gave the Maronites the pretext to concentrate the bulk of political power in their hands. This pretext is used to this today, despite demographic changes in favour of the Shiites.
While the Sunni leaders were largely co-opted by the Maronites, the Shiite remained the most socially deprived group. Many still living in rural areas, and another sections in the poorer urban suburbs, the Shiites live in immense poverty, while the Maronites and the Sunnis benefit greatly from Lebanon's emerging role as a financial nexus for Middle Eastern petroleum-capital and investors from the West.
This situation could not remain stable for long. The Maronite oligarchy found itself facing increasing opposition from the entire Lebanese population (including many rank-and-file Maronites). They accused this opposition from below of promoting "separatism" - trying to destroy the "peaceful co-existence" of the different ethnic groups in Lebanon. Actually, the opposite was true. This opposition revealed the collaboration of various ethnic groups, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Palestinian refugees and Druze, all united in the fight against the exploiting class, that had been using the ethnic shield to retain political and economic power. The true separatists were the Maronites themselves - which consistently fought against uniting Lebanon with the rest of the Arab world, especially with Syria.
Tensions erupted in a civil war which started in 1975 and officially ended in 1990. During that war a new section emerged within the Shiite ruling class. While the co-opted Shiite landowners were largely supportive of the order in Lebanon, a more populist faction emerged from among the Shiite religious leaders. This faction - called Amal (Hope) - demanded equality for the Shiite poor and grew out of their support.
This populist yet reactionary organization managed to stop the influx of many Shiites into the Left and secular resistance movements. The secular Left opposition demanded true equality for all peoples in Lebanon and an immediate end to the ethnocratic nature of the Lebanese state. By detaching the most exploited section s of the population from the Left opposition, Amal turned a class struggle that united various ethnic groups into an ethnic struggle that kept these groups apart. In this way it perpetuated the deadlock that governed Lebanese society from its beginnings.
In 1982, the situation of the Maronites was most dire. In desperation they pleaded with Israeli imperialism to assist them. Israel invaded Lebanon using the pretext of bringing under control the PLO- the Palestinian national liberation movement. This invasion very quickly became a long-term presence designed to protect the Maronite oligarchy. The Shiite villagers were concentrated in the south of Lebanon, which meant that they suffered most from Israel's aggression. This brought forth radicalisation within the Shiites and their leadership. As a consequence, Hezbollah grew as a more radical faction of Amal and finally, with the aid of Syria and Iran, took over as the leader of the Shiite resistance movement.
Hezbollah is a Dead-End
Hezbollah and Amal diverted the Lebanese class struggle along reactionary ethnic lines. For that reason they play a counter-revolutionary role in Lebanon. By hijacking the Lebanese class struggle, Hezbollah receives great political support which enables it to be the leading force in the Lebanese political arena. However, its separatist and reactionary nature prevents it from being a progressive force that can mitigate the distress of the Lebanese people.
The Lebanese counter-revolution could not have been accomplished without the generous assistance of the imperialist powers. From the days of French colonial rule until the present conflict, the imperial powers have consistently intervened in order to maintain the pro-Western oligarchy in Lebanon. This intervention was required to fight the Arab secular Left which was affiliated to the Soviet Union and raised the progressive flag of uniting the Middle Eastern artificial countries into a single state. At times of great distress for the Maronites, Western troops were sent to defend them. In the uprising of 1958 American troops were sent in. In the uprising of the seventies and eighties Israel intervened. These interventions prevented the Left from taking over. Disappointed by the failures of the secular Left, many Lebanese turned to religion.
However, precisely because Hezbollah only represents a faction of Lebanese society, it cannot solve any of the contradictions in Lebanon, just as the Maronites cannot do. Hezbollah took part in destroying the supra-ethnic nature of Lebanon's mass resistance movement - the only type of resistance that can solve the problems created by ethnocracy. Hezbollah can only replace one type of ethnic rule with another - but unlike the Maronites, Hezbollah will find it much more difficult to maintain stability. First of all, the Lebanese bourgeoisie are mostly of Maronite and Sunni origin. The army is also controlled by these groups. They are not ready to give political power to the Shiites. Secondly, Hezbollah will find itself isolated in the international arena. It will not be able to recruit the entire Lebanese society to defend its rule.
This drives a more inclusive standpoint to Hezbollah's political approach. Hezbollah's domestic actions show that all it wants is a piece of the political pie, and not much more. Just as Hamas did not go forward after taking over Gaza, Hezbollah also shows unwillingness to disrupt the present order: if they get too greedy, they might lose it all. An example of this is Hezbollah's support for the economic policy of Lebanon's late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, a flat income tax rate and the permission to import cheap Syrian labour in 2005, which utterly deteriorated the already poor conditions of the Shiites. Hezbollah was also silent about smuggling from Syria, which drove many Shiite farmers into bankruptcy. Hezbollah used funding from Iran to build a welfare network which gave it support from the same Shiites it had helped to push into even greater poverty. This example shows that Hezbollah would prefer political stability rather than the interests of its constituency, as long as it is getting its share of the pie.
The recent conflict in Lebanon was not about taking power, it was about maintaining it. Hezbollah retaliated to what appeared to it as an intention of the government to alter the status quo. Once the government backed down from its intentions, Hezbollah announced a cease-fire and withdrew from Beirut.
Thus, thanks to Hezbollah's counter-revolution, Lebanon will continue to be ruled by oligarchs, dividing up this tiny country among them, and completely paralysed in mending the social ruptures that they have provoked. The only hope for Lebanon is the re-emergence of the supra-ethnic class struggle that was derailed into a dead-end ethnic struggle. So far it seems that Hezbollah is stronger than ever: its victory over Israeli imperialism and the weakness of the Lebanese government has placed great power into its hands. However, this power is based on illusions: it cannot solve any of Lebanon's social problems.
There should be no mistake about it: Lebanon's problem is not an ethnic one, and not even a national one. It is an international problem. Lebanon is a small part of the international class struggle. The Maronite oligarchy is nothing but a puppet of global imperialism - earning their due in return for their contribution to preventing the Arab world from uniting. To bring true liberation for the peoples of Lebanon, it is necessary to go beyond arbitrary ethnic piece-of-the-pie struggles.
All over the Arab world, people are beginning to realize that the Islamic movements have no solutions. In Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Iraq we are beginning to see the mighty Middle Eastern proletariat reassemble itself for the next round of its battle against imperialism and the reactionary local elites that serve it. This is the only political power, the only hope for the plight of the Arab masses in Lebanon and in other countries. The international grip of imperialism can only be fought against by an international resistance of the workers. Any form of resistance that entails dividing workers along ethnic or religious lines will do nothing but maintain the imperial world order. RENEGADE EYE
Tuesday, 13 May 2008
Well over 60 people have been killed during the street fighting in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Maronite militias. What instigated the fighting was a decision of the Lebanese government to eliminate Hezbollah's telecommunications network. Hezbollah leaders regarded that move as a declaration of war on their movement and started an armed struggle against the government.
During the fighting, the utter impotence of the Lebanese state was clearly evident. It took only two days for Hezbollah to conquer the west of the capital city Beirut. Prime Minister Fuad Siniora ordered the army to intervene, but the army refused his command. The only ones that were prepared to fight for "stability" were the Maronite militias. After realizing the weakness of the state, Siniora backed down completely, announcing that Hezbollah's telecommunications network would remain intact.
The recent events show beyond any shadow of a doubt that the Lebanese state has no real power, and has stopped functioning. It is also clear that today Hezbollah is the most powerful political movement in Lebanon. Since the end of the 2006 war against Israel, there has been nothing to stop Hezbollah from taking control of the state and removing the minority-rule of the Maronite oligarchy. However, Hezbollah still seems to respect the Lebanese "rules of the game". It even expressed support for the Lebanese chief of staff - the Maronite Michel Suleiman - as the country's next president. What prevented Hezbollah from taking over lies in the nature of the Lebanese class struggle.
Class Struggle in Lebanon
Like many "post"-colonial counties, Lebanon is an artificial state, created by French imperialism. It was fashioned in a way that would allow the leaders of a Francophile religious sect - the Maronite Christians - to control the state while being a very small minority in the Muslim dominated Middle East.
A controversial ethnic survey conducted in 1932 showed that the Maronites were the largest ethnic group in Lebanon (although not having an absolute majority). The other two major groups were the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. This survey gave the Maronites the pretext to concentrate the bulk of political power in their hands. This pretext is used to this today, despite demographic changes in favour of the Shiites.
While the Sunni leaders were largely co-opted by the Maronites, the Shiite remained the most socially deprived group. Many still living in rural areas, and another sections in the poorer urban suburbs, the Shiites live in immense poverty, while the Maronites and the Sunnis benefit greatly from Lebanon's emerging role as a financial nexus for Middle Eastern petroleum-capital and investors from the West.
This situation could not remain stable for long. The Maronite oligarchy found itself facing increasing opposition from the entire Lebanese population (including many rank-and-file Maronites). They accused this opposition from below of promoting "separatism" - trying to destroy the "peaceful co-existence" of the different ethnic groups in Lebanon. Actually, the opposite was true. This opposition revealed the collaboration of various ethnic groups, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, Palestinian refugees and Druze, all united in the fight against the exploiting class, that had been using the ethnic shield to retain political and economic power. The true separatists were the Maronites themselves - which consistently fought against uniting Lebanon with the rest of the Arab world, especially with Syria.
Tensions erupted in a civil war which started in 1975 and officially ended in 1990. During that war a new section emerged within the Shiite ruling class. While the co-opted Shiite landowners were largely supportive of the order in Lebanon, a more populist faction emerged from among the Shiite religious leaders. This faction - called Amal (Hope) - demanded equality for the Shiite poor and grew out of their support.
This populist yet reactionary organization managed to stop the influx of many Shiites into the Left and secular resistance movements. The secular Left opposition demanded true equality for all peoples in Lebanon and an immediate end to the ethnocratic nature of the Lebanese state. By detaching the most exploited section s of the population from the Left opposition, Amal turned a class struggle that united various ethnic groups into an ethnic struggle that kept these groups apart. In this way it perpetuated the deadlock that governed Lebanese society from its beginnings.
In 1982, the situation of the Maronites was most dire. In desperation they pleaded with Israeli imperialism to assist them. Israel invaded Lebanon using the pretext of bringing under control the PLO- the Palestinian national liberation movement. This invasion very quickly became a long-term presence designed to protect the Maronite oligarchy. The Shiite villagers were concentrated in the south of Lebanon, which meant that they suffered most from Israel's aggression. This brought forth radicalisation within the Shiites and their leadership. As a consequence, Hezbollah grew as a more radical faction of Amal and finally, with the aid of Syria and Iran, took over as the leader of the Shiite resistance movement.
Hezbollah is a Dead-End
Hezbollah and Amal diverted the Lebanese class struggle along reactionary ethnic lines. For that reason they play a counter-revolutionary role in Lebanon. By hijacking the Lebanese class struggle, Hezbollah receives great political support which enables it to be the leading force in the Lebanese political arena. However, its separatist and reactionary nature prevents it from being a progressive force that can mitigate the distress of the Lebanese people.
The Lebanese counter-revolution could not have been accomplished without the generous assistance of the imperialist powers. From the days of French colonial rule until the present conflict, the imperial powers have consistently intervened in order to maintain the pro-Western oligarchy in Lebanon. This intervention was required to fight the Arab secular Left which was affiliated to the Soviet Union and raised the progressive flag of uniting the Middle Eastern artificial countries into a single state. At times of great distress for the Maronites, Western troops were sent to defend them. In the uprising of 1958 American troops were sent in. In the uprising of the seventies and eighties Israel intervened. These interventions prevented the Left from taking over. Disappointed by the failures of the secular Left, many Lebanese turned to religion.
However, precisely because Hezbollah only represents a faction of Lebanese society, it cannot solve any of the contradictions in Lebanon, just as the Maronites cannot do. Hezbollah took part in destroying the supra-ethnic nature of Lebanon's mass resistance movement - the only type of resistance that can solve the problems created by ethnocracy. Hezbollah can only replace one type of ethnic rule with another - but unlike the Maronites, Hezbollah will find it much more difficult to maintain stability. First of all, the Lebanese bourgeoisie are mostly of Maronite and Sunni origin. The army is also controlled by these groups. They are not ready to give political power to the Shiites. Secondly, Hezbollah will find itself isolated in the international arena. It will not be able to recruit the entire Lebanese society to defend its rule.
This drives a more inclusive standpoint to Hezbollah's political approach. Hezbollah's domestic actions show that all it wants is a piece of the political pie, and not much more. Just as Hamas did not go forward after taking over Gaza, Hezbollah also shows unwillingness to disrupt the present order: if they get too greedy, they might lose it all. An example of this is Hezbollah's support for the economic policy of Lebanon's late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, a flat income tax rate and the permission to import cheap Syrian labour in 2005, which utterly deteriorated the already poor conditions of the Shiites. Hezbollah was also silent about smuggling from Syria, which drove many Shiite farmers into bankruptcy. Hezbollah used funding from Iran to build a welfare network which gave it support from the same Shiites it had helped to push into even greater poverty. This example shows that Hezbollah would prefer political stability rather than the interests of its constituency, as long as it is getting its share of the pie.
The recent conflict in Lebanon was not about taking power, it was about maintaining it. Hezbollah retaliated to what appeared to it as an intention of the government to alter the status quo. Once the government backed down from its intentions, Hezbollah announced a cease-fire and withdrew from Beirut.
Thus, thanks to Hezbollah's counter-revolution, Lebanon will continue to be ruled by oligarchs, dividing up this tiny country among them, and completely paralysed in mending the social ruptures that they have provoked. The only hope for Lebanon is the re-emergence of the supra-ethnic class struggle that was derailed into a dead-end ethnic struggle. So far it seems that Hezbollah is stronger than ever: its victory over Israeli imperialism and the weakness of the Lebanese government has placed great power into its hands. However, this power is based on illusions: it cannot solve any of Lebanon's social problems.
There should be no mistake about it: Lebanon's problem is not an ethnic one, and not even a national one. It is an international problem. Lebanon is a small part of the international class struggle. The Maronite oligarchy is nothing but a puppet of global imperialism - earning their due in return for their contribution to preventing the Arab world from uniting. To bring true liberation for the peoples of Lebanon, it is necessary to go beyond arbitrary ethnic piece-of-the-pie struggles.
All over the Arab world, people are beginning to realize that the Islamic movements have no solutions. In Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Iraq we are beginning to see the mighty Middle Eastern proletariat reassemble itself for the next round of its battle against imperialism and the reactionary local elites that serve it. This is the only political power, the only hope for the plight of the Arab masses in Lebanon and in other countries. The international grip of imperialism can only be fought against by an international resistance of the workers. Any form of resistance that entails dividing workers along ethnic or religious lines will do nothing but maintain the imperial world order. RENEGADE EYE
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Lebanon: The Destruction of Alternatives
By MFL
In Lebanon, the majority of the civilians do not want a civil war; however, that was the case back in 1975 and they were dragged to a civil war.
The current politicians are practicing a process what is called: demobilization. This means all non-party affiliates are de-activated due to the lack of availability of alternatives or options to impose the over-all populations' voice on the politicians. Henceforth, the destruction of alternative aka space to function in opposition to the political parties' duet singing of 14th of March and the Opposition.
More to the point, activists who oppose the war are suffocated by the demolition forces of 14th of March and the opposition. They can't do nothing, and personally someone may wonder if they agreed with each other to cripple the activists from expressing their opinions. This becomes very much apparent when riots break out between party affiliates and the shooting takes place. In fact, the immigrants who left Lebanon in the quest of seeking a better life are the same victims of these politicians (partly because of those, and partly due to the Israeli aggression and foreign interventions). Those who are left immobile are given with the choice to choose: 14th of March or Opposition? Usually the question, my dear readers comes as follows: choose the worse of the two. In fact, they are both worse than each other. There is no country in the world currently that celebrates: "Our martyrs and their martyrs" more bluntly than our melancholic parties who promise us doom and destruction by the hands of the "Other Coalition".
With the progressive forces crippled, there is no space to be active at all. In fact, a person would simply watch TV rather attempt to change the reality. Political apathy has reached it's maximum when in 2005 the voting turnabout throughout Lebanon was barely 50%.
As a matter of fact, if a new player or a third force would rise to oppose both coalitions, they will surely agree against them. This we witnessed when Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces allied with each other against Aoun and his ex-Syrian buddies back in 2005. Then the lunatic general marginalized to a second force as an extension of 8th of March to become the new second line = the Opposition. Probably the majority of those who would vote for ex-war criminals and current business corrupted elites would do so because they would fear that the other would for their "scary alliance from foreign lands" (be that the USA or Iran). This means due to lack of activism and progressive (and real democratic) movements, a lot of the voters would simply vote as what they against what they view as the "invaders" to the "lesser evil".
The stalemate is on-going, while few civil society activists are attempting to maximize the odds. The majority of the Proletariat are de-activated in Lebanon. As the deadlock between the two corrupted forces of Lebanon continues, more people flee the country (due to security, possible a second war with Israel, lack of good economy, or a higher degree).
The arena remains for the Elites (the self-proclaimed Sect-Defenders) and their followers who refuse to wake up to the reality that they are all corrupt.
MFL
In Lebanon, the majority of the civilians do not want a civil war; however, that was the case back in 1975 and they were dragged to a civil war.
The current politicians are practicing a process what is called: demobilization. This means all non-party affiliates are de-activated due to the lack of availability of alternatives or options to impose the over-all populations' voice on the politicians. Henceforth, the destruction of alternative aka space to function in opposition to the political parties' duet singing of 14th of March and the Opposition.
More to the point, activists who oppose the war are suffocated by the demolition forces of 14th of March and the opposition. They can't do nothing, and personally someone may wonder if they agreed with each other to cripple the activists from expressing their opinions. This becomes very much apparent when riots break out between party affiliates and the shooting takes place. In fact, the immigrants who left Lebanon in the quest of seeking a better life are the same victims of these politicians (partly because of those, and partly due to the Israeli aggression and foreign interventions). Those who are left immobile are given with the choice to choose: 14th of March or Opposition? Usually the question, my dear readers comes as follows: choose the worse of the two. In fact, they are both worse than each other. There is no country in the world currently that celebrates: "Our martyrs and their martyrs" more bluntly than our melancholic parties who promise us doom and destruction by the hands of the "Other Coalition".
With the progressive forces crippled, there is no space to be active at all. In fact, a person would simply watch TV rather attempt to change the reality. Political apathy has reached it's maximum when in 2005 the voting turnabout throughout Lebanon was barely 50%.
As a matter of fact, if a new player or a third force would rise to oppose both coalitions, they will surely agree against them. This we witnessed when Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces allied with each other against Aoun and his ex-Syrian buddies back in 2005. Then the lunatic general marginalized to a second force as an extension of 8th of March to become the new second line = the Opposition. Probably the majority of those who would vote for ex-war criminals and current business corrupted elites would do so because they would fear that the other would for their "scary alliance from foreign lands" (be that the USA or Iran). This means due to lack of activism and progressive (and real democratic) movements, a lot of the voters would simply vote as what they against what they view as the "invaders" to the "lesser evil".
The stalemate is on-going, while few civil society activists are attempting to maximize the odds. The majority of the Proletariat are de-activated in Lebanon. As the deadlock between the two corrupted forces of Lebanon continues, more people flee the country (due to security, possible a second war with Israel, lack of good economy, or a higher degree).
The arena remains for the Elites (the self-proclaimed Sect-Defenders) and their followers who refuse to wake up to the reality that they are all corrupt.
MFL
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